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1  Introduction 
Central bankers are fond of regularly telling audiences that our understanding of the dynamics 
of inflation, not to mention inflation expectations, remains incomplete. For example, even 
before the financial crisis (GFC)1, Bernanke (2007) reminded his audience that “…we must 
understand better the historical variation in inflation expectations, the effect of this variation on 
actual inflation…”. Yellen (2017), well after the worst of the GFC had passed, pointed out to a 
different audience that “…economists’ understanding of exactly how and why inflation 
expectations change over time is limited.”  
Contributing perhaps to the confusion over what drives inflation dynamics is central bank 
communication of the kind in the opening remarks by King and Bernanke. As Wolf (2008) 
points out, the world cannot import inflation unless there exists “interplanetary trade” (Buiter 
2008, p. 87). A more sympathetic interpretation is that exchange rates, the quality of a nation’s 
monetary policy strategy, external shocks considered ‘global’ in nature, to mention three factors 
that contain ‘global’ elements, contribute to creating confusion between relative and absolute 
price changes.2 The former is not inflation in the usual sense of the word; control of the latter 
is the primary concern of the monetary authorities.  
One of the preoccupations of central bankers has been the role played by the forces of 
globalization and the challenges this poses for the ability of monetary policy to be responsive 
primarily to domestic economic conditions. The role of globalization is a line of enquiry 
prompted in part by the emergence of a global factor in inflation (e.g., Ciccarelli and Mojon 
2010, Forbes 2019). Carney (2017), Governor of the Bank of England at the time, put it in the 
following terms: “…globalisation has been accompanied by a weakening of the relationship 
between domestic slack and inflation, and by a corresponding strengthening in the relationship 
between global forces and domestic prices.” It is easy to see the origin of this concern over the 
role played by globalization in influencing inflation outcomes. Figure 1 shows mean annual 
average CPI inflation in a selection of advanced (AE) and emerging market economies (EME) 
since 1980 against an indicator of financial and trade globalization from the KOF Institute. 
Globalization in both trade and finance show steady rises, interrupted only by the GFC, and 
both indicators appear to stabilize thereafter while inflation in both AE and EME reveal a steady 
 
 
1  The 2008-9 financial crisis is either referred to as the Global or Great Financial Crisis. In both cases, 
the acronym GFC applies and is referred to hereafter as such.   
2  Ball and Mankiw (1995) argue that large relative price changes can have inflationary consequences 
(e.g., oil price shocks of the 1970s) although this appears to have been contradicted by similarly large 
oil price changes in 2011. More generally, there is no reason for relative price changes (e.g. due to 
globalization) to impact inflation (Rogoff 2006). Also unstated in the quotes at the beginning of the 
paper is that, for example, commodity prices are set in USD in international markets while inflation is 
evaluated in domestic currency terms.  
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Figure 1 Globalization and Inflation 
 
Note: Based on latest available data (2016) at the time of writing (September 2019) from 
the KOF (Swiss Institute) Globalization Index, available from 
https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html. 
Inflation, measured on the left-hand scale, is annual rate of change in the CPI. See section 
3 for data sources and coverage.  
decline interrupted only by a bulge in inflation in the late 1980s. Of course, patterns such as 
these do not establish causation but provide a potential justification of the remark made by 
Governor Carney. As we shall see, however, there is no consensus over the importance of 
“global forces” on inflation, the focus of this study. 
By the end of the 1980s academics and policy makers became convinced that central bank 
autonomy and, later, central bank transparency, together with a clear mandate for the central 
bank, would, combined with a floating exchange rate, relegated the inflation “problem” to one 
dictated by purely domestic considerations.  After all, an earlier generation experienced 
inflation that was high and volatile, and associated with stagnation, the legacy of two large oil 
price shocks and exacerbated by the limited exchange rate flexibility of the Bretton Woods era. 
A still earlier era saw the golden ‘fetters’ of the Gold Standard that produced frequent bouts of 
deflation (e.g., see Eichengreen 1992). Once again, global factors played a role in the 
transmission of inflation shocks across countries. Eventually, every one of these regimes 
became associated, at least in the minds of some policy makers, with unsatisfactory economic 
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performance.3 Policy regimes, deemed to have disappointed, were abandoned and new ones 
were ushered in that promised success by correcting past policy failures. Bordo and Siklos 
(2016, 2018) explore in detail the adoption and evolution of monetary policy regimes over time. 
More than two decades after the mantra of low and stable inflation spread globally, the GFC 
and the Great Recession that followed it especially in the advanced economies, renewed the 
debate about the wisdom of sticking with the existing monetary policy regime. However, unlike 
the debates of the past several decades, the problem now centers on inflation being too low. 
Together, all these developments reflect continued interest in trying to understand the dynamics 
of the relationship between inflation, inflation expectations, and broader economic 
performance. 
Following a brief historical recap of the recent literature on inflation dynamics, the role of 
inflation expectations, and the influence of globalization, the paper examines inflation and 
inflation expectations performance in 29 countries for over three decades until 2018. The data 
covers both advanced (AE) and emerging market economies (EME). The paper then examines 
the impact of global inflation and inflation expectations on individual and regional economies’ 
inflation performance.  
Time series modelling is also used to explore the extent to which structural breaks in the 
inflation process, and their timing, is common across countries, and whether this reflects the 
importance of ‘global forces’. I also explore whether crisis conditions have influenced cross-
country ‘interdependence’ in inflation. The global component driving domestic inflation is seen 
as the result of spillover effects that may be exacerbated or alleviated by structural changes in 
the inflation process. 
Briefly, three conclusions stand out. Global inflation impacts inflation in both AE and EME 
but the impact is far more heterogeneous than existing narratives would lead us to believe. 
Indeed, one’s interpretation of global influences on domestic inflation differs depending on 
whether poorly performing economies in inflation terms are considered as opposed to the 
standard practice of examining mean inflation performance. The focus on how observed 
inflation impacts individual economies ignores that inflation expectations, including a global 
version of this variable, also plays a critical role in inflation dynamics. Finally, there are 
significant spillovers in inflation between AE and EME, but these too are sensitive according 
to relative inflation performance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides brief literature 
survey. The data and methodology are outlined in section 3 prior to a description of the results 
in section 4. The paper concludes in section 5 with a summary and a few policy conclusions are 
drawn. 
 
3  Japan remains a ‘poster child’ for the view that deflation and stagnation are linked to each other. See 
Burdekin and Siklos (2004), Siklos (2020), and references therein. 
SIKLOS     Inflation Dynamics 
 
 207
2    The Global Factor in Inflation: Recent Views 
The need to understand not only the dynamics of inflation but the nexus between inflationary 
developments and inflation expectations is critical if existing models of inflation are to remain 
useful to policy makers. It is not difficult to find expressions of the need to better understand 
how these two variables co-vary, or their dynamic relationship. For example, former FOMC 
Chair Bernanke (2007), argues that “…we must understand better the historical variation in 
inflation expectations, the effect of this variation on actual inflation…”. Sargent (1999), 2011 
Nobel Laureate, argues that once the public comes to believe that the net benefits of higher 
inflation become negative there will be a demand for a lower inflation rate. Hence, a connection 
exists between inflation and monetary policy regimes. Presumably, when policy regimes 
change, one might expect to see a structural break in the inflation process. However, compared 
to other aspects of the study of inflation dynamics, there are relatively fewer studies of breaks 
in the inflation process. A few exceptions include Belkhonja and Mootami (2016) who estimate 
inflation models over a long sample and highlight the role of the 1970s oil price shocks and the 
GFC. Altansukh et. al. (2018) explore breaks not only in mean inflation rates in OECD 
economies but find clusters of breaks in the variances. They also report significant impact of 
global factors on domestic inflation. Zhang and He (2016), who focus on inflation in China 
whose role, as we shall see, has sparked some of the recent debates on global inflation 
performance, conclude that 1994 marks a point of structural change in the inflation process. 
That year marks the introduction of significant economic reforms to liberalize the economy. Eo 
(2015) finds that breaks are variable and time sensitive, at least in the US since the 1950s. Some 
parallels to this finding are reported below.   
A considerable challenge in this area is overcoming what may be surprising to many, namely 
that we have yet to develop a good understanding of the behavior of inflation expectations. 
Since the 1990s a growing number of central banks were mandated to achieve price stability 
and often this was explicitly specified via a numerical inflation target (e.g., see Siklos 2017).   
While the GFC led a reallocation of tasks many central banks in favor of evincing a concern 
for financial stability, debate over the future course of inflation (or deflation) remain at the 
forefront of central bank concerns. This is true, in spite of mounting evidence that global 
economic slack persists, primarily in the industrial world.4 Soon after the GFC erupted, there 
were fears that global fiscal stimulus measures would generate excessive inflation or, at least, 
the de-stabilizing inflationary impulses that characterized pre-central bank independence stop-
 
4  Apart from the usual challenges in measuring the level of slack in the economy is uncertainty over 
whether allowances should be made for a significant structural shift in potential economic activity, not 
to mention the distribution of slack as between domestic and global sources. See, inter alia, Borio and 
Filardo (2006), and IMF (2013).  
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go type monetary policy regimes (e.g., see Goodfriend and King 2013). These factors, taken 
together, can easily lead to conditions that can de-anchor inflationary expectations.  
A mere five years after the GFC, the IMF (2013) concluded that inflation is “The Dog That 
Didn’t Bark”, largely thanks to the benefits of central bank independence and an improved 
capacity of the part of policy makers to control an economy’s inflationary impulses. However, 
as central banks have increasingly been called upon to support fiscal policy and finance 
sovereign debt, considered unsustainable by some (e.g., Schoder 2013), the potential collateral 
damage is that central banks are losing their independence. Even if inflation is not imminent, 
the de-anchoring of inflation expectations, given its persistence properties (e.g., Fuhrer 2009), 
can exacerbate observed inflation rates if the central bank finds it difficult to modify the stance 
of monetary policy. Others have argued that we can ignore while not turning a blind eye to 
inflation and shift the weight of policies almost exclusively in the direction of attaining higher 
economic growth (e.g., Brittan 2013, Wadhwani 2013).   
It is worth noting that IMF (2013) examines only the inflation record in advanced 
economies. Underlying economic uncertainty is ignored, as are exchange rate regime choices 
and central bank transparency. The remarkable stability of inflation over the past few years may 
also be a reflection of the increasing reliance, if not coordination, of inflation expectations with 
those of the central bank. Morris and Shin’s (2002) analysis warns us of the theoretical 
possibility that this can happen. Even if some of the ingredients of their model are considered 
implausible (Svensson 2002), a potential source of the de-anchoring of inflation expectations 
is the loss of credibility in central banks’ forecasting performance, possibly reflected in a rise 
in forecasters’ disagreement vis-à-vis the forward-looking scenarios of the central bank (e.g., 
Siklos 2013, Bordo and Siklos 2019).     
Rules-based policies, including the Taylor rule which represents the embodiment of modern 
monetary policy making, ensure that shocks that lead inflation and economic output to deviate 
from their respective targets or capacity levels can eventually (and optimally) be eliminated via 
manipulation of an instrument of monetary policy, ordinarily an interest rate. However, 
economic ‘headwinds’ in unusual times may well justify a looser policy for an extended period. 
As a consequence, a tightening would be delayed only after inflation returns to target. 
Policymaking under these conditions requires flexibility of a different type from the 
‘constrained discretion’ that defines central bank behavior in normal times.5 The implication 
then is that central banks may be required to act ‘irresponsibly’ for a time until normal economic 
 
5 To illustrate, the Bank of Canada’s approach to monetary policy reacting to headwinds (or tailwinds) is 
explained in its July 2011 Monetary Policy Report, p. 28-29. Headwinds include continued currency 
appreciation; tailwinds stem from the effects of financial shocks. This description serves to partly 
explain the Bank of Canada’s stance in crisis times. Presumably, these phenomena are also applicable 
to other economies. 
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conditions return.6 Why these same central banks did not act in a way that would obviate the 
need to be irresponsible, thereby threatening their reputation, is never properly explained. 
If the prospect of future inflation above some target pre-occupies some central banks others 
are also concerned about a renewed threat of deflation. Although there is little evidence that 
mild deflation is economically harmful7 some central banks are determined to avoid prolonged 
deflations at all costs.  
Until the GFC, the primary source of concern over the global element in inflation came from 
evidence that emerged linking the rapid growth of the Chinese economy to a decline in inflation 
rates worldwide. Indeed, such was the concern that China’s rapid development would drive 
prices down globally that it sparked worries about the spread of deflation. However, for reasons 
that are beyond the scope of this paper, narratives about deflation were by then also wrapped 
up with developments in Japan where very low inflation and deflation gripped that economy 
for over a decade. Bernanke (2002), at the time a member of the Board of Governors of the 
Fed, publicly declared that the Fed would stand against deflation thanks to the “…structural 
stability of the U.S. economy…” and the Fed’s determination to “…take whatever means 
necessary to prevent significant deflation…”. Never mind that the relationship between 
deflation and economic performance was largely biased by the experience of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and that China’s own deflation in the 1990s may have been of the 
‘good’ variety (e.g., see Burdekin and Siklos (2004), Siklos and Zhang (2010), Borio and 
Filardo (2007), and Borio, Erdem, Filardo and Hofmann (2015)).  
The emergence of China as a great economic power on the global stage generated a flurry 
of studies of China’s contribution to individual countries’ inflation rates. For example, 
Eickmeier and Kühnlenz (2018) conclude that China’s impact on global inflation is often less 
than 10% while Zhang and He (2016) remind us that, even if China’s growing economic might 
has global impact, shocks from the rest of the world also effect China’s economy, especially 
since the mid-1990s. The bottom line, as Bailliu and Blagrave (2010) and Chen and Siklos 
(2020) point out, is that China’s economy belongs in the group of globally systemically 
important economies even if the country belongs to the group of EME.  
The initial focus on China’s role in global inflation and economic activity was soon replaced 
by the broader issue of how rising globalization in both trade and finance (e.g., see Figure 1) 
may have contributed to the fall in inflation over the past decade.8 As the quote at the beginning 
 
6 This view is attributed to Woodford (2012) who argues that, where relevant, policy rates may be required 
to stay at the zero lower bound beyond the time suggested by the Taylor rule.  
7 The fear of deflation is dominated by the experience of the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 
1930s. For relevant empirical evidence that explores the consequences of different episodes of 
deflation, see Burdekin and Siklos (2004), and Borio and Filardo (2004). 
8  Prior to the arrival of China on the scene studies of the determinants of inflation did not entirely ignore 
‘global forces’. Indeed, in small open economies, worries over external influences on domestic inflation 
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of the paper suggests, even central bankers can fall prey to logical inconsistencies or, rather, 
mis-communication by confusing relative and absolute price changes. Moreover, exchange 
rates and monetary policy strategies ought to play a role as bulwarks against external shocks 
(Bohl, Mayes, and Siklos 2011). That said, global factors, even in a world where monetary 
policy is sovereign and countries float their exchange rate to differing degrees (Ilzetzki, 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2019), can still potentially drive domestic inflation rates.9 Hence, interest 
in the notion that there is a global element in inflation dynamics has not waned in the literature 
that has investigated various puzzles in it behavior.   
No consensus has emerged yet on the question of how important global factors are in 
explaining relatively low inflation rates in recent years. Nevertheless, there is growing 
acceptance of the view that a global element can play a role in inflation dynamics even if 
evidence from its importance ranges from marginal (e.g., see Brouillette and Savoie-Chabot 
2017) to large (e.g., Ciccarelli and Mojon 2010). Part of difficulty is the recognition that the 
role of global factors has changed over time (e.g., Forbes 2019). Moreover, it may be the case 
that some components that are important drivers of inflation are more cyclically sensitive than 
others (e.g., services; Stock and Watson 2019).  Another challenge stems from the possibility 
that the pass-through effects of global factors on domestic inflation rates may well be dictated 
by differences in economic circumstances faced by advanced versus emerging market 
economies (e.g., Parker 2018), although there is evidence that inflation rates are looking more 
alike around the world in recent years (e.g., Ha, Kose, and Lieselotte Ohnsonge 2019). 
An element that is curiously missing from much of the literature is the role played by the 
relationship between observed and expected inflation. The former is, by far, the focus of interest 
in the studies cited above. In contrast, the role of expectations generally plays a critical role in 
country-specific studies. Yet, how well expectations are anchored is an issue that cannot be 
adequately addressed via studies that rely on observed inflation data alone. Mehrotra and 
Yetman (2018) propose a more realistic method to investigate the long-run anchoring of 
inflation expectations. However, based on a sample for a large number of countries, they cannot 
reach a definitive conclusion about the extent to which professional forecasts are informative 
about anchoring. Clark and Davig (2009), relying on US data, find that shocks to inflation 
expectations are transitory. Nevertheless, these expectations are found to be crucial in driving 
observed inflation.   
 
were often evaluated in terms of the impact of import prices or exchange rate effects in domestic 
inflation. Examples include is Dungey and Pitchford (2000) for Australia, and an even earlier example 
is Fried (1973) for Canada.  
9  As is well-known, an important distinction is the one between headline and core inflation rates. Data 
limitations limit the study of global factors on core inflation beyond a handful of economies. However, 
Bhatnagar et. al. (2017) conclude that core inflation is not influenced by global factors. Altansukh et. 
al. (2017) find that energy shocks from abroad play an important role in driving a global inflation factor. 
The authors also focus on the behavior of core inflation co-movements among OECD economies. 
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A major difficulty, of course, is spotty data availability beyond advanced economies. 
Nevertheless, Feldkircher and Siklos (2019), in a study that covers over 40 AE and EME,  find 
that commodity price changes, notably oil prices, are likely candidates for the de-anchoring of 
expectations. More generally, inflation expectations are also found to contain a global 
component although whether these are the same as the ones driving observed inflation remains 
unclear (e.g., see Siklos 2010). Indeed, even in emerging markets, domestic longer-run inflation 
expectations, themselves linked to the policy regime in place, drive domestic inflation (Bems 
et. al. 2018). Hence, it is not surprising that central bankers have tended to zero in on food and 
energy prices as a major source of concern in setting and communicating the stance of monetary 
policy even if, in doing so, they have created some confusion, as noted above.   
3    Data  
Quarterly data since 1980 were obtained from sources provided in Bordo and Siklos (2019).10 
Nevertheless, due to data limitations for several of the emerging market economies many of the 
tests reported below rely on samples from 1995.1-2018.3 (95 observations) or 1998.1-2017.4 
(80 observations), depending on whether observed or expected inflation data, respectively, are 
used.11 Expected inflation is defined as the one year ahead inflation forecast a time t. Forecasts 
are fixed horizon forecasts (see Siklos 2013). A total of 29 economies are included, consisting 
of 12 AE and 17 EME. In what follows, each economy in the data set is identified by its two 
letter ISO code. Table 1 provides a key. 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics. Notable is the wide range of inflationary 
experiences with large gaps between the highest and lowest inflation rates. This is especially 
true of emerging market economies. Of course, reflected in the large standard deviations of 
inflation. It is worth remembering, as first seen in Figure 1, that sample averages mask the 
downward trend in inflation, and inflation variability, in both AE and EME since the 1980s. 
Moreover, a focus solely on the mean inflation experience also implies missing some 
potentially interesting dynamics contained in the overall distribution of inflation performance. 
Table 1 also provides summary statistics for the two inflation forecasts that are combined in 
some of the tests reported below. It is worth pointing out that Consensus and WEO forecasts12 
are generally comparable except when mean inflation rates are high, that is, for EME. Finally, 
 
 
10  The details are contained in a data appendix available online from https://data.nber.org/data-
appendix/w26342/. 
11  For example, I excluded periods of very high inflation or hyperinflation during the 1980s and early 
1990s which plagued several EME especially in the data set (e.g., for BR, PL RU, IL, MX, PE, TR)  
12  These are the forecasts published twice a year by the International Monetary Fund in its World 
Economic Outlook (WEO). 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics: Inflation and Inflation Expectations 
Observed Inflation 
 
AR AU BR CA CL CN CO CZ EZ GB HU ID IL IN JP KR MX MY NO NZ PE PH PL RU SE TH TR US ZA 
 Mean 12.12  2.55  7.13  1.86 3.79 2.83 7.81 3.40 1.71 2.03 7.43 8.99 2.98 6.91 0.15  2.94 8.86 2.53 2.10 2.06 3.91 4.54 5.49 16.31 1.16 2.74 28.00 2.23  6.09 
 Median 9.77  2.47  6.21  1.83 3.50 2.03 6.02 2.43 1.90 1.94 5.36 6.47 1.82 6.32 -0.10  2.69 4.74 2.32 2.17 1.96 3.20 4.08 3.42 11.35 1.06 2.47 10.28 2.20  5.92 
 Maximum 40.31  6.08  26.50  4.48 9.30 22.60 21.79 13.25 3.77 4.81 30.38 58.57 13.33 17.86 3.60  8.93 48.70 8.41 4.70 5.30 12.90 10.28 32.79 116.82 4.28 10.29 73.04 5.30  13.43
 Minimum 0.04 -0.33  1.82 -0.86 -3.30 -1.87 1.85 -0.39 -0.38 -0.03 -1.06 -0.60 -2.52 0.46 -2.21  0.56 2.27 -2.29 -1.43 -0.50 -1.36 -0.06 -1.21 2.25 -1.42 -2.78 4.34 -1.62  0.44 
 Std. Dev. 10.36  1.29  4.28  0.81 2.31 3.96 5.87 3.13 0.86 1.01 7.20 9.91 3.51 3.33 1.02  1.65 9.75 1.44 0.99 1.27 3.04 2.31 7.00 19.83 1.17 2.51 27.13 1.13  2.51 
 Observations 83  95  93  95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95  95  95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 90 95 95 95 95  95 
 
Combined Inflation Forecasts 
 
AR AU BR CA CL CN CO CZ EZ GB HU ID IL IN JP KR MX MY NO NZ PE PH PL RU SE TH TR US ZA 
 Mean 10.88  2.54  6.70  1.91 3.51 2.43 8.23 3.67 1.72 2.43 7.40 8.23 1.92 7.01 0.29  2.92 7.75 2.53 2.02 2.19 3.22 4.33 6.42 7.73 1.65 2.62 8.20 2.27  6.37 
 Median 10.75  2.54  5.87  1.91 3.31 2.12 5.43 2.76 1.89 2.47 4.93 6.65 1.90 6.53 0.28  2.73 4.35 2.45 2.03 2.16 2.71 4.08 3.18 7.93 1.70 2.75 7.80 2.29  6.04 
 Maximum 37.34  3.96  42.06  2.81 5.29 11.10 22.51 9.34 2.70 3.93 24.97 28.72 4.26 13.73 2.41  7.96 27.62 4.67 2.95 4.23 7.71 7.13 28.21 12.31 2.58 4.29 11.32 3.42  11.24 
 Minimum -0.13  1.51 -3.23  0.86 2.70 -0.47 2.50 1.22 0.51 0.68 1.20 3.34 0.14 3.97 -1.04  0.91 2.93 0.86 1.12 0.68 2.23 2.03 0.56 2.10 0.53 0.30 6.23 0.41  3.85 
 Observations 95.00  95.00  88.00  95.00 80.00 91.00 92.00 88.00 75.00 95.00 92.00 95.00 68.00 95.00 95.00  95.00 95.00 92.00 68.00 80.00 80.00 52.00 92.00 51.00 68.00 52.00 51.00 95.00  95.00 
 
Note: combined inflation forecasts are the mean of Consensus and WEO one year ahead inflation forecasts. Observed inflation is the 
annual rate of change in CPI inflation. Data are from Bordo and Siklos (2019). Country codes (ISO ) are as follows: AR (Argentina), 
AU (Australia), BR (Brazil), CA (Canada), CL (Chile), CN (China), CO (Colombia), CZ (Czech R.), EZ (Eurozone), GB (Great 
Britain), HU (Hungary), ID (Indonesia), IL (Israel), IN (India), JP (Japan), KR (Korea), MX (Mexico), MY (Malaysia), NO (Norway),  
NZ (New Zealand),  PE (Peru), PH (Philippines), PL (Poland), RU (Russia), SE (Sweden), TH (Thailand), TR  (Turkey), US (United 
States), ZA (South Africa).
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standard deviations for most forecasts are smaller, occasionally considerably smaller (e.g., in 
AU, BR, ID, and RU) than their counterparts for observed inflation.  
Next, we turn to estimation of the global factor. I follow others (e.g., Forbes 2019, Bordo 
and Siklos 2019) by extracting the first principal component of inflation. Clearly, other methods 
can be used but one advantage if this approach, other than its wide applicability in obtaining a 
common component of several series, is that it is easy to evaluate the degree to which each 
economy’s inflation rate has in common with the other inflation rates in the factor model 
Furthermore, this approach is relatively parsimonious which is also an advantage when the 
number of observations is relatively modest.13  
Nevertheless, I consider two modifications to traditional factor model estimation. First, in 
order to ascertain how sensitive subsequent test results are to the construction of global series, 
I estimate a global inflation series not only based on the data for all 29 economies but also 
separate estimates that rely on data only from AE and EME, respectively. Second, and arguably 
more importantly, time-varying estimates of the global factor are estimated using by extracting 
the factor scores, that is, the series that proxies global inflation, from factor models estimated 
in a rolling manner. This is accomplished as follows. Each factor model consists of inflation, 
mean Consensus and WEO inflation forecasts, and WEO forecasts for all the economies in the 
sample, or AE and EME separately. I estimate the same factor models for samples that range 
from 8 to 10 years in length in a rolling manner. Samples begin in 1992 for AE and 1998 for 
EME and all economies together.14 The sample is rolled ahead one to two years at a time.15 
This produces a series of overlapping samples.16 The estimated factor scores are averaged when 
samples overlap to produce a unique factor estimate that is time-varying.17 
Figure 2 respectively compares observed inflation for AE and EME with their ‘global’ 
counterparts estimated via time-varying factor models as described above.18 There are several 
interesting features to note from the plots. The decline in observed and forecasted inflation from 
 
 
13 For example, loadings (i.e., akin to regression weights) the relative importance of each for the 1st 
principal component for advanced economies explain between 60% and 81% of the variation in 
inflation. This figure drops for all economies in the dataset to a range of 37% to 49%. Communality 
(i.e., the percent of the variance each individual inflation series shares with the other variables in the 
factor model) is very high for both AE and EME and ranges from a low of 64% to a high of 99%.  
14 Hence, for example, the first sample for AE is 1992-1999. 
15 Two-year rolling seems adequate for AE and one year rolls are preferable for EME not only because 
the sample is shorter but also, as noted earlier, inflation rate levels have changed considerably more in 
that part of the world than in AE.  
16 The samples are 5 years long for EME and 6 years for the AE. The slightly longer span for AE is due 
to the smaller volatility of inflation among these economies than in EME (see Table 1).   
17 And we can obtain a range of estimates of the global factor (i.e., maximum, minimum, median). 
18 Estimates for all economies in the sample are relegated to the appendix. 
Review of Economic Analysis 12 (2020)  203-233 
 
214 
 
Figure 2. Estimates of Global Inflation: AE and EME 
 
Note: MEAN refers to the (unweighted) inflation rate for advanced (AE) and emerging 
market economies (EME). “O” refers to estimates based on observed CPI inflation as 
defined in the text. F1 refers to the 1st principal component of inflation. All factor scores 
are time-varying in the manner described in the min body of the paper 
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the late 1990s to the mid-2000s in EME is clearly visible. Second, both AE and EME 
experience a surge in inflation, both global and domestic varieties, just before the GFC. A 
reversal then takes place very quickly, again in both parts of the globe. However, the rise in 
observed inflation is considerably smaller in EME than in AE, at least relative to estimates 
based on the combination of forecasts or WEO forecasts alone. Next, there is a secondary surge 
in inflation in AE but not in EME after the GFC. Perhaps this reflects the initial impact of 
unconventional monetary policies in the large AE economies in the sample (i.e., US, UK, and, 
subsequently, the EZ). Finally, the decline in various indicators of observed and global inflation 
after 2011 is also visible and the phenomenon is shared by both AE and EME. 
In what follows we use all three estimates of global inflation (observed, combination of 
forecasts, WEO forecasts) to explain inflation developments in the individual economies in the 
sample as well as for the group of AE and EME. However, to conserve space, not all the results 
can be discussed. The results discussed below emphasize the role of global (i.e., AE and EME 
together) inflation and inflation expectations on domestic inflation rates.      
4    Methodology and Empirical Results 
Empirical testing proceeds in two steps. The first phase consists in asking about the timing of 
structural breaks in a model of inflation where explicit allowance is made for a global factor to 
influence domestic inflation, in addition to other determinants. The literature generally takes 
two positions when considering the possibility of statistical breaks in the data. These can be 
accounted for based on some widely acknowledged event deemed exogenous. In this case the 
GFC represents an obvious candidate. Alternatively, it has been suggested that a statistical 
metric ought to be employed to select a breakpoint, that is, the identification of breaks ought to 
be data-determined. Both sides of the debate have strong points in their favor. Those who 
advocate a historical approach argue that events, and their dating, speak for themselves and can 
also be used to gauge the relative importance of shocks that cannot easily be accommodated or 
measured by available time series. Researchers who favor a data-driven approach point out that 
even when events can be dated via historical analysis the impact on the time series of interest 
need not occur simultaneously with an event dated via observers’ judgment. Consider the GFC. 
Although many chronologies have been developed, the beginning and end of the GFC differ 
depending on the author. For example, the St. Louis Fed’s chronology19 begins in February 
2007 while the New York Fed’s chronology20 begins in June of the same year. If we also 
 
19 See https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/timeline/financial-crisis. 
20 See https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/policyresponses.html. The Fed’s 
chronology also provides separate US and international timelines. 
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include the Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis21 there is also the potential of overlap with the 
GFC, at least at the start. Yet another illustration is the adoption of a new monetary policy 
regime such as inflation targeting. Often these regimes are announced well ahead of their formal 
adoption or there may be a transitional period before the regime is fully implemented (e.g., see 
Bordo and Siklos 2018).   
Accordingly, in what follows, I examine the impact of statistical breaks on inflation in the 
individual economies in our sample as well as in the advanced and emerging market regions as 
a whole by allowing breaks to be both endogenously and exogenously determined. In the case 
of exogenously imposed breaks I restrict the analysis to the period of the GFC since this clearly 
is the most obvious candidate for a shift in the inflation process. The dates proposed by 
Dominguez, Hashimoto, and Ito (2012) are used.22 In the case of endogenously estimated 
breaks I follow the Bai-Perron (1998) multiple break-point test for the data from individual 
economies (also see Bai and Perron 2003a, 2003b), and Bai (2010) for the multiple break point 
test in a panel setting. To conserve space the panel consists of inflation for the AE and EME 
regions as opposed to the individual economies in the dataset. Furthermore, given the length of 
the sample, I restrict the number of breaks to a maximum of two and consider only innovation 
outliers, that is, a break that is deemed to have a potentially permanent impact on inflation. 
With the exception of one additional test (see below) breaks that interact with one or more 
series are omitted to conserve degrees of freedom. These assumptions can, of course, be relaxed 
but it is unclear that there are significant net benefits from the added model complexity. These 
complications are left for future work. Finally, Newey-West standard errors are estimated, and 
breaks that are statistically significant at the 1% only are considered while trimming at either 
end of the sample of ± 5% is imposed.23 To further limit the possibility of minor breaks to be 
estimated along with larger (and more statistically significant breaks) the sequential version of 
the null hypothesis is used. In other words, the null of one statistically significant break must 
be rejected before a second break is permitted.24  
The model of inflation estimated in the no-break case is written as follows: 
 
21 The ECB used to publish a timeline comparable to the ones in the previous two footnotes but this has 
been removed. See Siklos (2017) and https://www.bbc.com/news/business-13856580 for an example 
of a chronology of the Eurozone crisis. 
22 Their analysis does not identify a GFC period for the Eurozone. Instead, I took the dates for Germany, 
Italy, France, and Spain, the Eurozone’s largest economies, and dated the start of the GFC as the earliest 
and latest dates in all four countries. 
23 This effectively implies that breaks cannot be estimated for 1995 or 1998 and 2017 or 2018, depending 
on the particular sample in question.  
24 That is, if there are potentially K breaks, the null of K+1 is tested against the alternative of K breaks. 
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G
t t t t t t t t t t tE E g g i cπ α α π α α α α ε α α π η+ + − − − − −= + + + + + + + +0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1   (1) 
where π is the annual inflation rate estimated as 100 times of the fourth order log difference in 
the CPI, Etπt+1 is the one year ahead inflation forecast as the proxy for inflation expectations, 
Etgt+1 is the one year ahead forecast of real GDP growth, g is observed real GDP growth, i is 
the central bank policy rate, ε is the rate of change in the real effective exchange rate, c is the 
growth rate of commodity prices, and πG is the global inflation proxy obtained from the factor 
models described earlier. Recall that one global inflation proxy relies on observed data while 
the second proxy relies on forecast combinations. Data sources were provided earlier (i.e., see 
Bordo and Siklos 2019). Resort to rates of change in real GDP, commodity prices and real 
exchange rates is standard though it should be noted that studies of this kind may rely on 
deviations from some equilibrium where the latter, unobserved, is estimated via one of several 
filters (e.g., Hodrick-Prescott). I chose to rely on rates of change for selected variables for ease 
of exposition as well as based on the extensive testing of various filters discussed in Bordo and 
Siklos (2019).  
Equation (1) is a typical model of inflation with a measure of economic slack (i.e., g), and 
expected inflation appearing in most versions of a Phillips curve equation. Similarly, estimates 
of the determinants of inflation for small open economies might include a real exchange rate 
variable. Less frequently encountered are models that incorporate commodity prices or the 
global inflation proxy (e.g., see Siklos 2020). I did conduct some experimentation with lags as 
well as incorporating other potential candidates as determinants such as credit growth, housing 
price inflation, and the rate of change in equity prices, but these did not fundamentally change 
the results or there were some gaps in the data which did not allow me to include all 29 
economies in some of the tests reported below.25 Nevertheless, I return below to the question 
of inflation determinants beyond the ones shown in equation (1).  
Table 2 lists, for each economy in the sample, the dates selected by the Bai-Perron or Bai 
tests for multiple endogenously estimated breaks. The Table is structured so that AE are shown 
first followed by EME. Conditional on (1) most economies experience two significant breaks 
in the inflation process. A very few shows signs of a single break (e.g., CL based on the global 
inflation forecast factor for AE), or none (e.g., CN based on the global inflation forecast factor 
for all economies).  
Although the test provides a precise date for each break the coefficient is, of course, 
measured imprecisely. Hence, as a rule of thumb, I consider a change in the inflation process 
 
 
25 For example, private non-bank financial assets, a common indicator of credit growth is available for 
only 21 of the 29 economies in the dataset. 
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Table 2 Structural Breaks in Inflation: Endogenous and Exogenous 
 
Economy 
Observed Inflation Inflation Forecasts  
GFC All AE All AE
AU 2003.2,2012.1 2001.4,2012.1 2006.2,2012.1 2001.4,2012.1 2008.3-2009.2 
CA 2003.2,2012.2 1999.2 2004.2,2012.2 2003.2,2012.4 2008.3-2009.2 
CZ 2007.4,2012.1 2003.1,2007.4 2007.4,2013.1 2007.4 2008.4-2009.1 
EZ 2007.4,2013.1 2002.4,2013.1 2007.4,2013.1 2011.4,2015.3 2008.1-2009.3 
GB 2005.2,2012.2 1999.1,2004.2 2007.3,2012.3 2001.4,2008.2 2008.2-2009.2 
IL 2013.3,2009.4 2003.3,2011.3 2003.4,2009.1 2003.3,2007.4 2009.1-2009.4 
JP NONE 2001.1,2013.3 2010.1,2013.3 2002.1,2013.3 2007.2-2009.1 
KR 2010.1,2014.4 2010.2,2016.1 2009.3,2015.1 2009.1,2014.2 2007.4-2009.1 
NO 2004.2,2011.2 2004.2,2011.1 2004.2,2008.2 2004.2,2008.4 2008.4-2009.2 
NZ 2006.3,2011.4 2010.2,2015.1 2008.3,2011.4 2012.3,2015.1 2008.4-2009.2 
SE 2007.1,2011.4 2009.4,2014.1 2008.4,2012.3 2007.4,2012.4 2007.4-2009.1 
US 2009.4,2015.4 2009.4,2015.1 2006.4,2012.1 2009.4,2015.1 2008.3-2009.2 
AR 2005.1,2015.2 2005.1,2017.4 2005.1,2014.2 2005.1,2015.2 2007.4-2009.1 
BR 2001.4,2013.4 2000.4,2015.1 2007.3,2015.2 2001.2,2015.1 2008.3-2009.1 
CL 2007.3,2017.4 2003.2,2014.2 2010.4,2015.2 2013.1 2008.2-2009.1 
CN 2004.4,2012.2 2006.3,2011.2 NONE 2008.3,2012.3 2008.4-2009.1 
CO 2001.1,2012.1 2000.2,2011.2 2003.4,2014.1 2001.1,2011.2 2008.4-2009.1 
HU 2008.1,2012.1 2007.4,2015.2 NONE 2007.4,2009.4 2008.4-2009.1 
ID 2007.3,2010.3 2007.3,2010.3 2003.1,2010.3 2007.3,2011.2 2008.3-2008.4 
IN 2001.3,2010.3 2000.1,2010.3 2011.1,2014.1 2001.2,2010.3 2008.4-2009.1 
MX 2003.22013.4 2002.2,2014.2 2008.2,2010.4 2008.2,2011.3 2008.3-2009.1 
MY 2004.4,2009.3 1999.2,2009.3 2006.3,2011.1 2003.2,2011.3 2008.3-2009.1 
PE 2007.3,2012.4 2007.4,2013.1 2005.1,2009.1 2007.4,2013.2 2008.3-2009.1 
PH 2007.2,2009.3 2007.2,2009.3 2007.3,2010.2 2007.3,2009.3 2008.4-2009.1 
PL 2007.1,2013.1 2000.1,2009.1 2008.1,2013.1 2001.1,2007.1 2008.4-2009.1 
RU 2008.2,2010.3 2009.4,2014.1 2008.3,2012.3 2008.4,2012.3 2008.3-2009.1 
TH 2007.1,2009.4 2008.4,2015.1 2008.3,2010.2 2007.3,2009.4 2008.3-2009.2 
TR 2010.2,2015.2 2010.1,2016.2 2007.4,2012.1 2010.1,2016.2 2008.3-2009.1 
ZA 2002.1,2009.1 2002.3,2010.3 2003.4,2009.1 2002.3,2009.4 2009.1-2009.2 
PANEL 2008.1,2000.2 2007.4 AE 
2001.3 EME
2007.4,1998.2 2008.1,2011.1AE 
2005.4,2009.2EME 
NA 
 Note: Highlighted dates are break dates that are consistent with the dates shown in the 
GFC column. Dates in italics indicate break dates that take place before the GFC dates 
for the US. Underlined dates are GFC dates that occur after the GFC begins in the US. 
The panel refers to the stacked aggregated values for inflation and inflation forecasts in 
the AE and EME. 
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due to the GFC when the endogenously estimated date is within a year of the range of dates 
 provided in the last column to be the same as in the case when dates are exogenously 
specified.26 The GFC column represents an exogenously dated break in inflation. Note that the 
GFC started earlier than in the US in several economies (identified by dates in italics). The GFC 
is associated with a change in the inflation process in only 3 to 5 of 12 economies when global 
inflation is proxied using observed data, but in more economies (up to 7) when ‘global forces’ 
are estimated from inflation forecasts. The same is true for EME with almost half impacted by 
the GFC though the impact is felt most when advanced economies’ inflation rates are assumed 
to feed into domestic inflation rates. None of the breaks appear to be due to the introduction of 
inflation targeting.27 Nor do the breaks, with the possible exceptions of CA and MY, coincide 
with the exchange rate regime change chronology of Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2019).28  
While the GFC can account for many breaks in the data there is considerable heterogeneity 
in the dating of breaks in the inflation process with many occurring either quite early in the 
sample, that is, in the early 2000s, or well after the GFC ended but possibly during the 
Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis (i.e., after 2012). The last row of the Table lists the dates when 
common breaks occur in AE and EME. These breaks capture quite well the finding for 
individual economies so that the GFC is seen as significant when the entire data set is used (i.e., 
a panel where AE and EME are stacked29) or when AE economies are grouped together while 
the GFC is only significant in the EME group of countries alone when the global factor is 
derived from inflation in AE only. Otherwise, the second break tends to take place early in the 
sample. While a specific association with the introduction of IT is not apparent the fact that 
breaks in inflation are estimated in the late 1990s and early 2000s is notable since this is the 
range of dates when inflation targeting was introduced in several EME (see Bordo and Siklos 
2019). 
Tables 3 and 4 report the coefficient estimates of the impact of global inflation on both 
individual economy inflation rates as well as the panel of AE and EME groups of economies. 
The highlighted values identify the coefficients that are statistically significant at least at the 
10% level of significance with a distinction made between positive versus negative effects on 
domestic inflation.  
 
26 Recall these are from Dominguez, Hashimoto, and Ito (2012) who derive their estimates from country-
specific peak to through changes in real GDP. 
27 The appendix to Bordo and Siklos (2019) provides the dating of the introduction of inflation targeting 
(IT) in the data set used here. With the exception of CZ and KR, AE adopted IT before the sample over 
which the break tests are conducted.  
28 The appendix provides the relevant dates. 
29 Recall that the relevant regressions are based on mean estimates of the variables for the AE and EME 
groups of economies, respectively. Fixed effects are also included (not shown) in the estimation. 
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Table 3 The Global Factor: Observed Inflation, Endogenously Estimated Breaks 
 
Economy 
Observed - ALL Forecast - AE Observed - No 
Breaks 
1st  2nd  3rd  1st  2nd  3rd  ALL AE 
AU -1.38(.00) .10(.47) -.54(.08) 2.13(.01) -1.38(.01) .58(.00) -.19(.00) -.49(.00) 
CA .28(.10) .00(.97) -.96(.02) -.30(.80) .50(.03) -.48(.01) -.07(.17) -.18(.07) 
CZ -.05(.82) .62(.06) -.71(.07) -2.55(.00) 2.28(.00) .84(.23) .54(.00) .97(.00) 
EZ .13(.25) -.21(.00) -.43(.00) .25(.19) .30(.00) -.44(.10) -.14(.01) -.01(.95) 
GB .48(.00) .26(.05) .23(.04) -2.29(.00) -.51(.14) -.37(.00) .32(.00) .49(.00) 
IL 1.25(.54) .79(.08) -.92(.00) 4.72(.00) -.43(.90) .03(.94) .66(.01) .35(.43) 
JP .04(.20) 1.07(.00) 1.00(.02) .78(.01) .04(.08) .07(.24) 
KR -.25(.11) -.33(.70) .68(.01) .60(.02) -1.86(.00) -.41(.00) -.01(.92) -.66(.08) 
NO -1.72(.00) .86(.00) -.97(.09) -1.80(.01) 8.72(.00) -1.09(.00) .58(.00) -.23(.37) 
NZ -.71(.00) .30(.04) -.26(.50) .30(.67) 1.06(.01) -.14(.57) -.18(.07) -.39(.02) 
SE 1.14(.00) -.12(.25) -.33(.00) -1.31(.00) .47(.39) -.09(.88) -.04(.73) -.31(.07) 
US -.17(.03) .91(.00) -1.17(.00) -.37(.30) 1.57(.00) -.39(.10) -.08(.19) .04(.78) 
AR .26(.02) -.43(.06) -.16(.06) 6.05(.00) .84(.35) -9.89(.00) -.20(.32) -.47(.35) 
BR .53(.04) -.16(.18) .15(.84) 1.45(.10) -.08(.82) -1.1(.17) -.32(.11) -.53(.11) 
CL .84(.07) .21(.83) -,19(.83) -.20(.81) -.87(.23) -1.35(.47) -.79(.04) .76(.04) 
CN .49(.07) -1.99(.00) .05(.86) -.04(.90) -.63(.00) -.33(.21) 
CO 1.92(.00) .14(.23) -.04(.84) -.76(.48) .46(.22) .69(.33) .35(.08) -.29(.30) 
HU 3.53(.00) -1.85(.00) -2.03(.06) -.78(.00) -.14(.49) -.21(.49) 
ID 26.69(.16) -.02(.97) -1.80(.02) -15.87(.00) 3.10(.00) .70(.25) -.17(.64) -.002(.98) 
IN 8.38(.00) .84(.04) 2.85(.00) -5.23(.00) -5.43(.02) 1.35(.00) 1.46(.00) .23(.67) 
MX .77(.00) .42(.00) 1.35(.00) .88(.27) -1.74(.00) .51(.00) .40(.00) .74(.00) 
MY .23(.21) .95(.00) -.80(.00) .44(.76) 5.98(.00) -.39(.07) .73(.00) .94(.00) 
PE .30(.17) .60(.04) -2.03(.00) -1.21(.03) 7.98(.01) -.97(.07) -1.8(.53) .07(.80) 
PH .07(.76) 1.08(.02) -.53(.10) 6.42(.00) 3.18(.00) .51(.00) .77(.00) -.004(.99) 
PL -1.68(.00) .36(.02) -.41(.04) -4.19(.00) .26(.27) -1.28(.17) -.63(.00) -.68(.01) 
RU -1.28(.04) 2.72(.00) -.40(.36) 3.75(.00) .98(.30) .70(.12) -.23(.30) -.04(.89) 
TH -9.15(.00) -2.82(.00) .20(.48) 9.83(.02) 1.87(.00) .66(.05) -.01(.97) .31(.43) 
TR .89(.01) -1.95(.03) 1.73(.00) -.68(.85) -1.99(.00) .71(.05) -.22(.29) .21(.33) 
ZA 1.34(.35) -2.00(.00) .24(.51) -4.75(.00) -8.08(.00) .22(.18) -.56(.02) -1.12(.00) 
PANEL .18(.19) .61(.00) 1.34(.00) .28(.05) -1.42(.00) .80(.01) .84(.00) -.28(.00) 
Note: p-values provided in parenthesis. See equation (1) for the estimated specification. 
Coefficients for α7 are shown and positive versus negative statistically significant 
coefficients are separately highlighted by color. 
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Table 4 The Global Factor: Observed Inflation, Exogenous Breaks 
Economy GFC Observed - ALL GFC  
Forecast - 
AE
AU .24(.61) -.21(.02) .06(.88) -.50(.00) 
CA .27(.58) -.09(.14) .21(.64) -.19(.06) 
CZ .67(.47) .53(.00) 1.08(.23) .95(.00) 
EZ .21(.26) -.17(.00) -.09(.60) -.01(.90) 
GB 1.00(.02) .18(.06) 1.04(.01) .31(.03) 
IL 2.31(.03) .67(.01) 3.95(.01) .90(.06) 
JP .32(.12) .02(.30) .38(.07) .03(.62) 
KR .04(.91) -.01(.91) .45(.16) -.70(.00) 
NO .43(.58) .52(.02) 1.85(.06) -.23(.36) 
NZ .56(.36) -.21(.05) .12(.84) -.39(.03) 
SE 1.16(.00) -.13(.27) 1.20(.00) -.40(.02) 
US -.03(.94) -.08(.31) -.34(.35) .07(.59) 
AR -2.00(.32) -.15(.47) -2.08(.30) -.37(.47) 
BR 2.12(.16) -.45(.04) 1.49(.29) -.68(.07) 
CL 1.05(.28) -.69(.07) 1.41(.14) .75(.05) 
CN -.49(.54) -.59(.00) 1.32(.10) -.34(.19) 
CO -.29(.78) .38(.10) .69(.45) -.32(.26) 
HU -3.85(.00) .10(.57) -3.64(.00) -.10(.70) 
ID 3.64(.03) -.62(.14) 2.42(.11) -.06(.91) 
IN .46(.77) 1.44(.00) 2.51(.15) .17(.75) 
MX -.78(.20) .48(.00) -.11(.35) .76(.00) 
MY 2.24(.00) .52(.00) 2.92(.00) .81(.00) 
PE 2.78(.00) -.26(.32) 2.80(.00) .22(.41) 
PH 1.95(.06) .47(.10) 3.13(.00) -.32(.32) 
PL 2.23(.03) -.73(.00) 1.05(.31) -.70(.00) 
RU 2.30(.03) -.35(.11) 2.11(.04) -.17(.57) 
TH -2.38(.01) .13(.44) -2.17(.01) .29(.43) 
TR 1.21(.30) -.33(.16) 1.32(.14) .10(.67) 
ZA 1.54(.20) -.61(.01) .71(.56) -1.10(.00) 
PANEL .61(.07) .79(.00) 2.58(.00) -.96(.00) 
Note: See note to Table 3 
Globalization, at least as interpreted by the recent literature (see section 2), is generally viewed 
as generating a reduction in inflation. If this benchmark is used, then only South Africa meets 
the standard regardless of how global inflation is proxied or even whether breaks in the inflation 
process are included. Otherwise only a few economies see a reduction in inflation conditional 
on endogenously estimated breaks and when global inflation is proxied using observed inflation 
rates. They are: AU, EZ, and GB among the AE and ID and TH among the EME. A reduction 
in inflation is obtained in HU, IN, and PL, in addition to ZA mentioned earlier when global 
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inflation is proxied by a combination of inflation forecasts in AE. These countries belong to the 
EME group. In general, the breaks see a mix of positive and negative changes in the inflation 
process. Hence, if globalization is believed to have reduced inflation then the breaks do not 
seem to be linked to this phenomenon.  
This is especially true for the panel estimates shown at the bottom of Table 3. Other than 
the middle break, when global inflation is proxied by one year ahead forecasts, the breaks in 
inflation see a rise in inflation. Only when breaks are ignored, and forecasts are used to measure 
the ‘global forces’ on inflation, is a reduction in mean inflation observed.    
A similar picture emerges when an exogenous break is considered as shown in Table 4. 
Nevertheless, what is interesting is that the GFC appears to raise average inflation rates in 
several AE and EME regardless of how the global inflation proxy is defined. As remarked 
earlier (see Figure 2) both AE and EME experienced a surge of inflation which was soon 
reversed. It is likely that some of the results in Table 4 are sensitive to the dating of the GFC 
when it is exogenously imposed. On balance, that is, when panel estimates are considered 
(bottom of Table 4), global inflation depresses domestic inflation when it is proxied by the one 
year ahead forecast for AE; otherwise global inflation, based on observed data, raises mean 
inflation in AE and EME. The good news is that, whether exogenously imposed or 
endogenously estimated, links between global inflation and domestic inflation and the impact 
of breaks on inflation are broadly similar. Moreover, while global inflation exerts a significant 
impact on domestic and regional inflation rates, it is clearly sensitive to the period examined. 
There is, therefore, no simple narrative linking ‘global forces’ and inflation. This is consistent 
with Carney’s remark mentioned earlier who did not indicate the sign of any influence of global 
inflation on domestic inflation rates.      
This much is clear so far. First, global inflation exerts a significant effect on domestic 
inflation. Second, even if we estimate a model of inflation that contains the usual variables and 
is augmented by forward-looking variables, that is, inflation and real GDP growth forecasts, 
there are still structural breaks that are necessary to improve the explanatory power of estimated 
regressions.    
Two more tests are considered. There is an idiosyncratic element in the dating of breaks in 
inflation at the level of individual economies. A comparison, however, with the results for AE 
and EME suggests that many economies, other than during the GFC and its aftermath, 
experienced a shift in inflation in the earlier parts of the sample when inflation reduction 
policies were in place in AE and beginning to be introduced more widely in EME. In addition, 
estimates of global inflation also suggest strong interdependence in inflation rates though more 
so among AE than among EME. Accordingly, I next consider the spillover of inflation rates in 
AE versus EME relying on a test of contagion. Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin 
(2005) reviewed the methodologies with a more recent and more general update given by 
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Rigobon (2019). Although other forms of contagion have since been defined Rigobon (2019) 
points out that contagion and spillovers, while not necessarily synonymous, are fundamentally 
similar concepts. In Forbes and Rigobon (2002) contagion refers to an increase in correlation 
between series in a crisis period relative to more “normal” times. Dungey et. al. (2005) suggest 
that differences in definitions of contagion are “minor”. Since volatility also tends to rise during 
crisis conditions a natural way to think about contagion is to focus on changes in volatility. 
Unfortunately, changes in volatility need not occur only under crisis conditions. 
Interdependence is a better way then to characterize an increase in volatility when there is no 
contagion. Therefore, identification of crisis periods is critical. As we have seen, not all 
structural breaks are associated with a crisis but can, for example, reflect a change in policy 
regimes. 
Table 5 presents the results of tests of ‘contagion’ or spillovers between global inflation and 
combined global inflation forecasts for a panel of data aggregated at the level of AE and EME 
as well as for the AE and EME groups of economies separately. Following Rigobon (2019), 
and given the heterogeneity of inflation performance across AE and EME as well as within 
each of these groups, the tests are also carried out for the ‘corner solutions’ of those with the 
highest inflation (and inflation forecasts) or lowest inflation rates over time.30   
Following Dungey et. al. (2005) I write a version of the Forbes-Rigobon specification as 
follows: 
Table 5 ‘Contagion’ Between Observed and Expected Inflation 
 INF vs F1 
-ALL 
INF vs F1 
- AE 
INF vs F1 
EME 
F1 vs INF 
-ALL 
F1 vs INF 
- AE 
F1 vs INF 
EME 
Min .72(.00) .21(.21) .04(.96) .26(.03) .25(.29) .46(.00) 
Contagion 6.04(.05) 5.55(.08) 1.50(.47) 
Max -.41(.09) .36(.21) -.84(.03) .10(.39) .43(.02) -.12(.51) 
Contagion 3.94(.14) 9.10(.01) 3.35(.19) 
Mean -.69(.00) .07(.70) -2.22(.00) .23(.00) .60(.00) -.02(.86) 
Contagion 1.10(.58) 3.47(.18) .10(.95) 
Note: test based on system (2). The system was estimated via GMM with 2 lags of the dependent 
and independent variables (except the dummies) as instruments. P-values given in parenthesis 
 
30 Since the data are aggregated different countries (or economies) are represented over time.  
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    (2) 
The system of equations (2) consists of the (standardized) global inflation and global inflation 
expectations31, that is, both series are scaled by their standard deviations during ‘normal’ times, 
the variables o etπ ≠ represent observed global inflation (o) or expected global inflation (e) for a 
panel consisting of both AE and EME series stacked32 or, separately, for either AE or EME 
economies. The null 0 i, jH : λ 0, i j= ∀ ≠  indicates the presence and strength of the contagion 
or spillover effects. 
Table 5 indicates, first, spillovers between global observed and global expected inflation are 
sensitive according to whether we consider mean, maximum or minimum inflationary 
experiences in both AE and EME, and whether or not we combine the two groups of economies. 
For example, in the case where AE and EME are considered jointly, whereas at the mean and 
for the worst performing economies in terms of global inflation is lower during the time the 
world experienced the GFC (i.e., pre-GFC; 1,2λ 0< ), the reverse is true for the best performing 
economies (i.e., max). Similarly, global expected inflation is higher in crisis than in ‘normal’ 
times on average and for economies with the lowest global inflation rates while expectations 
did not respond for economies where inflation rates are highest. When the AE are considered 
alone there is no evidence that global inflation is different in crisis versus pre-crisis times. The 
reverse is largely true for EME where global inflation is lower due to the GFC on average and 
for the worst inflation performers in that region. Similarly, global inflation expectations in AE 
rise in the GFC relative to ‘normal’ times, again at the mean as well as at the highest global 
inflation rates. The only similar impact for the EME is found for economies in that region with 
the lowest global inflation rates. 
Turning to contagion or spillovers the null cannot be rejected in most cases indicating, 
especially at the mean, that there are no spillovers between inflation and expected inflation. 
Contagion is found, however, among the best performing economies in terms of global inflation 
when both AE and EME are stacked together as well as among the AE economies alone. Stated 
differently, even if there are spillovers between observed and forecasted global inflation this is 
limited to the ‘best’ performers among the AE and EME. Hence, if global inflation or inflation 
 
31 Both the combined forecasts and WEO forecasts are considered. However, in view of the widely agreed 
conclusion that forecast combinations outperform individual forecasts (e.g., Timmermann 2006) I 
report only this case below. Others are available on request. 
32 The model is estimated with fixed effects. 
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expectations impact country or economy-specific inflation rates there can be a disconnect 
between the determination of global inflation and expected inflation. 
Next, I ask how global shocks impact inflation and selected other determinants. For this 
case the panel of AE and EME is considered. I estimate a panel local projections version of 
equation (1) which is written 
h
t h h h t 1 h t h,tψ (L) β π+ −= + + +y α y υ    (3) 
where y is a vector of endogenous variable, that is, e e Gt t t t t(π , π ,g ,i , π ) '  and where, to conserve 
degrees of freedom, commodity prices and a dummy for the GFC are treated as exogenous 
variables. The addition of the GFC dummy seems appropriate given the earlier discussion.33 h 
is set to 10 periods, L=2 and, by way of comparison, point estimates from a conventional VAR 
are also shown in Figure 3.34  
The impulse responses reveal that global inflation forecasts have no significant impact on 
inflation or real exchange rates. Instead, rising global inflation forecasts raise domestic inflation 
expectations and real GDP growth forecasts as well as domestic policy rates. Hence, while 
much of the relevant literature has focused on the link between global and domestic inflation, 
shocks from abroad also broadly impact domestic monetary policy. Perhaps more striking is 
that domestic shocks impact global inflation expectations. Therefore, although policy makers 
have expressed concern about the inflationary consequences of external inflation shocks, 
domestic shocks themselves have implications for global inflation expectations. This possibility 
is one that the extant literature has tended to be silent about. Notably, both rising observed and 
expected domestic inflation in the AE and EME results in higher global inflation, the same 
result holds for a positive real GDP expectations shock. Similarly, a depreciation shock raises 
global inflation expectations as does a rise in domestic policy rates.  
A difficulty with the foregoing results is that they are informative only about mean 
responses. Yet, as shown earlier, the impact of global factors also differs between the best and 
 
 
33 Other dummies, given findings of structural breaks in inflation were also tried but the results discussed 
below are unchanged (not shown). A few illustrations are relegated to the appendix. Recall that the 
panel is estimated with fixed effects. 
34 To avoid clutter confidence bands for the conventional VARs are not shown. However, inference is 
largely the same for the local projections and the conventional VARs except for the impact of a shock 
to the policy rate (i) on global inflation expectations (F1_FCAST) which is statistically insignificant at 
all lags while negative at lag 6 in the local projections case. Most, not all, impulse responses are similar 
when global observed inflation is used. For example, higher global inflation reduces real GDP growth 
forecasts but, as shown below, the reverse holds for global inflation forecasts. I return to the implication 
of some of these differences in the conclusions. 
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Figure 3 Impulse Responses: The Impact of Global Expected Inflation Shocks 
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Note: Thick solid lines are impulse responses estimated via a standard Cholesky 
decomposition with the variable ordering as indicated in equation (3). Thin solid lines are 
impulse responses estimated via a local projection. Again, see equation (3). 80% 
confidence intervals are shown as dashed lines 
worst performing economies in terms of inflation. Therefore, I supplement the analysis in 
Figures 3 with quantile local projections. This implies estimating a version of equation (3) 
written as 
h
t h h h t 1 h t h,tQ( τ) (τ) ψ (L τ) β (τ)π (τ)+ −= + + +y α y υ    (4) 
where Q represents the quantile local projection and τ are the quantiles. To conserve space, 
Figure 4 presents the impulse responses for  τ=.1,.25,.75, and .9. confidence intervals are also 
omitted to avoid clutter, but the dashed circles indicate lags where the impulse responses are 
statistically significant at the 80% level. The top-left portion of Figure 4 suggests that global 
shocks (i.e., GLOBAL) negatively impact inflation in AE (i.e., INF_AE) at all but the 0.25 
quantile after 4 and 5 lags. However, as the top-right portion of Figure 4 indicates a rise in 
global inflation raises inflation expectations (i.e., PFCAST_AE) in AE contemporaneously and 
after 1 lag. Thereafter, at all quantiles, the impulse responses are all insignificant. 
Turning to the EME (bottom left and right hand side plots in Figure 4) we observe that 
global inflation shocks have no impact on inflation at the estimated quantiles shown while, as 
was true for AE, a rise in global inflation raises inflation expectations in EME but only among 
the best performers in terms of inflation (i.e., at quantiles 0.1 and 0.25) after 7 to 10 lags. All 
these results underscore the heterogeneous nature of the impact of global inflation on domestic 
inflation, highlight the diversity of the impact of global shocks to inflation expectations and the 
differential responses to global shocks as between AE and EME. Once again, there is no simple 
narrative that explains links between global inflation shocks and the dynamics of domestic 
inflation. 
5    Conclusions 
There is little doubt that domestic inflation rates are influenced by global inflationary 
developments despite monetary policy and exchange rate regimes that are intended to shield 
inflation from external shocks. Nevertheless, this result misses at least three features of the data 
that the extant literature has under-reported. First, there is considerable heterogeneity in the size 
and sign of the impact of global shocks on domestic inflation in the sample of 29 advanced and 
emerging market economies examined. Moreover, there are no simple distinctions between the 
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Figure 4 Impulse Responses: Quantile Local Projections for the Impact of Global Inflation Shocks 
Note: TAUPT indicates the impulse response estimated at quantiles 0.1 (1), 0.25 (25), 0.75 (75), and 0.9 (9). The top set of impulse 
responses show the response of (observed) inflation (INF_AE) or inflation forecasts (PFCAST_AE) to a global inflation shock 
(GLOBAL). The bottom set of impulse responses show the case of EME.  The circles indicate those lags where some or all of the IR 
are statistically significant at the 80% level. Estimates are based on the Epanechnikov kernel sparsity, covariances are estimated via 
the Markov Chain Marginal bootstrap, the Huber sandwich, and Hall-Sheather bandwidth. 
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AE and EME when it comes to how global inflation, whether of the observed or forecasted 
variety, impacts domestic inflation. Second, whereas previous studies have focused on how 
external inflation shocks impact domestic inflation, there is a significant link between domestic 
inflation, at the level of advanced and emerging market economies, and global inflation. Third, 
how global inflation shocks impact domestic inflation rates depends in part on whether the 
shock stems from observed or expected inflation.  
Almost all previous studies allow only a role for globally observed inflation. Yet, as central 
banks around the world have become more forward-looking, there ought to be more explicit 
recognition that domestic inflation is also partly determined by global expected inflation. 
Finally, one important difference between AE and EME inflation performance remains. 
Observed inflation has a significant impact on expectations in AE while there is no impact from 
expectations in the other direction. In contrast, there is a clear tendency for expected inflation 
to influence observed inflation. When both economies are jointly examined there is a bi-
directional relationship between observed inflation and inflation expectations.  
Nevertheless, the strength and sign of the links are sensitive according to whether one 
examines mean performance versus economies that are the best or the worst performers in terms 
of inflation. Therefore, the impact of global factors in individual economies is partly a function 
of their performance vis-à-vis others in either the advanced or emerging market group of 
economies. Indeed, spillover effects in inflation from global to domestic inflation are found 
only for the AE and, globally, only for the best inflation performers.    
If the global element driving individual country inflation rates persists then existing policy 
rules that have served us reasonably need not be modified but central banks should provide 
clearer explanations and regularly update the public on the degree to which external pressures 
drive inflation. Currently, this type of communication tends to be more episodic in nature. Only 
time will tell whether standard monetary policy rules, routinely used by central bankers to 
communicate the stance of monetary policy, will need to be explicitly modified to take these 
eternal pressures into account. Nor is this a small open economy problem. Even systemically 
important economies like the U.S. have begun to take external factors into account when 
deliberating the appropriate stance of monetary policy.  
At least three extensions should be considered before the results presented in this study are 
seen as more definitive. First, instead of conducting some of the tests at a high level of 
aggregation, additional estimation at the country or economic-specific level needs to be 
generated. Panel or global VARs may be insightful in this regard (e.g., see Bordo and Siklos 
2019, Feldkircher and Siklos 2019). Next, a deeper investigation of the connection between 
individual inflation performance in relation to its peers among either the AE or EME should be 
conducted. Finally, it would be desirable to combine observed and expected inflation to get a 
more realistic measure of how global factors impact domestic inflation. These extensions are 
left for the future. 
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